Box politics

Party politics always have been a mixture of national interests and ideological perception.

It matters however whether an ideology emerges under the banner of national interests or whether national interests become fashioned in accordance with ideology. Over the last few decades the latter has overtaken the former.

Under the perspective of society as a complex dynamic system the phenomenon stems from the clustering of affinity relationships within a nation leading to the formation of subsystems representing such clusters until they have become entities in their own right, and which from then on continue in a self-serving manner. The result is a party that places its ideology ahead of the overall national interest.

In the US former congressman Mickey Edwards discussed that development in his book “The Parties Versus the People: How to Turn Republicans and Democrats Into Americans”. In his interview on PBS Newshour he said, “the one thing that George Washington, John Adams, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson all agreed on was don't create political parties. And the parties they had in that day were things where a few people got together on three issues, four issues, five issues, but not like what we have today, permanent factions, Republicans, Democrats always on opposite sides, and the founders all warned against that”.

In Australia the situation is similar. So much so that addressing just about any issue in terms of some suggested solution will immediately categorise the speaker as being either left- or right-wing, depending on which party happened to claim ownership of the idea at some stage.

As a consequence the substance of one’s remarks becomes tainted with a whole host of connotations derived from the particular party. A conceptual transference takes place in which the speaker not only has to deal with the original concept but however unwittingly is seen as being representative of a much wider contingent and is responded to accordingly. This does not help the debate.

What follows are examples of themes, in no particular order, of which significant parts have been appropriated by political parties to varying degree and junked together under their banner instead of being allowed to form their own contexts.

• Support for private enterprise is important, but a modern society requires public utilities so that anyone can have the opportunity to operate within that society regardless of financial means and personal standing.

• Give due regard to individualism and personal rights, but there also is a place for collective measures because a complex society needs the means to facilitate interdependence among its various functionalities.

• A handful of super athletes enjoy massive amounts of investment, yet physical dysfunction is spreading across the entire population sometimes in epidemic proportion because of insufficient resources for physical education.

• As a consequence the pressure on the nation’s health system increases constantly, but anyone who suggests people should be less lazy and irresponsible is roundly condemned.

• Spending hundreds of millions of dollars to save a few koalas is accepted without fuss, but at the same time the laws undermine the productivity of fruit growers (ie, humans) because they are not permitted to act against pests which destroy their crops.

• Against the growing competitiveness of other nations we remove one challenge after another from children’s lives turning them into clumsy incompetents while even punishing parents if they don’t toe the official line.

• The emphasis is on keeping up-to-date with the latest developments in any given field (sometimes even measured in monthly intervals), yet we are supposed to stand in awe before indigenous demographics whose culture had not changed over tens of thousands of years.

• We give lip-service to common standards since every society needs a certain homogeneity in order to function, while at the same time celebrating multiculturalism for making life more colourful and not considering that life is more colourful precisely because homogeneity is mitigated. Besides, cultures in exile invariably stagnate and so become a caricature of their live counterparts in the home country; the result is a society of fossils.

• Asylum seekers should be processed properly and not be palmed off to another jurisdiction, but consideration should also be given to the quality of potential newcomers because it needs a viable population to create the standards where assistance is affordable in the first place.

Follow the parliamentary debates and it becomes obvious that any one of the above will be voiced by one or the other political party but to the exclusion of so much of the rest. In the current political climate is has become practically impossible to pursue a set of policies which are comprehensive in terms of a reasoned approach; choose one party for one idea but forego the other.

No wonder the electorate is becoming more and more disillusioned with its representatives.

The ESM as a function of Chaos

The European Stability Mechanism has been given the green light from a legal perspective and the markets are mostly relieved. Yet many see also danger. Since the ESM is part of the wider European economy and is therefore subject to the principles inherent in complex, dynamic systems, it is possible to examine its status in terms of Chaos, the technical term for this kind of environment, and so identify the challenge it faces.

A large-scale complex and dynamic system relies on the interdependency of its functional elements, which is another way of saying that those subsystems must be able to productively communicate with each other in order to maintain the feedback mechanism the system relies on. The larger the system, the greater the probability that the necessary synchronisation cannot be sustained because one or some of the elements enter a state not in congruence with the rest. 

There are essentially two ways in which the possibility for incongruence can be checked.

Either there exists a sufficiently strong authority which ensures that any subsystem adheres to its performance envelope and so prevents incongruent states from emerging, or the entire system is homogenous enough so that its parts autonomously adhere to the overall standard and/or theme.

The foregoing has been expressed generically on purpose to emphasise the universality of these principles.

As far as the EU is concerned, the ESM represents an entity that is designed to allow for and administer financial subsystems that failed.

In terms of complex systems we have Europe's financial framework (at that scale a subsystem in itself compared to the EU), containing further subsystems representing their particular euro-zone counterparts. Since the ESM is supposed to come into effect in case of failure (some economies have indeed already failed to live up to their intended designs), the mutual congruence is not given to begin with. Furthermore, the mechanism is meant to provide a functional envelope that is capable of overcoming discrepancies in its host system and correct them - and all this while still ensuring the internal integrity of each subsystem in question. That is the challenge.

Although there are many details - particularly in the current context - that have been omitted here, they are of a content-related nature. In other words, they are details relating to specific banks and their customers, their type of involvement in their own economies and the exposure to the outside, the types of businesses with their own performances and the exact components that make up a failure. Nevertheless, in terms of principle behaviour of and within complex dynamic systems the scenario runs along the lines described.

In the essay on Europe, written in 2006, the overall situation has been outlined with certain problems listed as potential developments inherent in such a system. As the ensuing years have shown, some of them did eventuate.

The present situation is once again a particular state of affairs, a phase state of the self-same system, which contains the potential for certain outcomes. In technical terms they can be seen as latent states, that is states for which the preconditions exist but which have not achieved a sufficient degree of import and/or bias for them to influence their surrounds.

Should that happen, that particular subsystem will have entered a new state and as such will change its host to some extent.

As far as governments are concerned, and its administrative derivatives such as the boards of banks, the idea still persists that an economy is essentially a form of some mechanical apparatus where an adjustment here and some input there have predictable consequences.

Unfortunately, quite the opposite is true. Economies are chaotic systems, they progress along their timelines via affinity relationships, the clustering and/or dispersal of functional modules, and pattern-seeking phase states subject to the occasional bifurcation or break point. 

Since such dynamics do not lend themselves to budget forecasts, political speeches, or investment newsletters, this part of reality gets shunted out of our consciousness. The result, failed policies, constant political arguments and confusing debates, social unrest even, remains an ongoing fare of nations.

No wonder economist Steve Keen calls his field the "naked emperor of the social sciences"*), and again not surprisingly, only few have the courage to agree with him.

*) Steve Keen, Debunking Economics, the naked emperor of the social sciences, Zed Books, London, 2004.

Man vs God

At the beginning of this month a court in Cologne, Germany, ruled that to circumcise young boys is against the law. The “fundamental right of the child to bodily integrity outweighed the fundamental rights of the parents” it said. In this case the boy was a four-year-old Muslim.

Since the circumcision of boys is practised under Judaism as well, the court’s decision sparked outrage among the Jewish community, even beyond Germany’s borders. Israel’s president Peres wrote to his German counterpart to support the right to ritual circumcision.

The way the protests are running is interesting in itself, but for now let us consider the issue under Otoom.

Human activity systems are essentially just that – systems. A nation constitutes a system, so does religion, so does an economy, a political party, and so on. Furthermore, they all contain sub-and sub-subsystems right down to the individual and together they form a whole at whatever scale happens to be under focus.

Systems also possess an identity, and since their constituent parts interact with each other the performance of any one of them has consequences for the whole.

How a system such as a nation identifies itself is in the end up to that society. Whatever its perspective (an aggregate of all its subsystems), it influences the overall outcome and by doing so establishes the degree of sustainability in the long term.

Here we have a large-scale system (Germany), containing another system (Judaism), and the question is, what happens when one law (a subsystem) is in opposition to another. What are the consequences?

If a society has decided that there are fundamental principles around which it turns, and if these principles have been arrived at by considering the untenability of changing the body of someone who is incapable of giving consent, then such a decision is based on a rationale which derives its validity from a conscious process of examining the possibilities inherent in not starting from such a base.

In other words, should some idea (or fashion, or custom, or ideology) suggest a transgression of the fundamental principle, the principle itself needs to be re-examined under the same auspices of rational consideration. This constitutes the ultimate protection against a lack of reason.

A religion functions under a different framework. The particular interpretation of what ‘god’ means, what is assumed to be that god’s law, and how the members of this system are supposed to act are immutable once the religion has established itself. That moment could have occurred 400 years ago, it could have occurred 4000 years ago. In any case, the identity is maintained because it is held to be immutable.

If a society contains members of a religion, then the hierarchy of principle rules has to be decided upon. What comes first, the principles of the society (let’s label them ‘S’) or the principles of the religion (‘R’)?

If S comes before R, then any demand from R is subjected to an examination based on S. If S is based on reason, R will be allowed or rejected dependent on what S has to offer.

Suppose R is held to be above S, and suppose further that it is claimed R conducts itself with due consideration given to the welfare of its subjects, therefore S has no need or indeed any right to interfere.

If S is above R, the opportunity, no, the guarantee exists that any problematic consequences are examined under due process (see above). But if R comes before S, what guarantee exists now? The consequences are not analysed under rational auspices but within the framework of a subjective interpretation of what is right and what is wrong. The outcomes will be a result of someone’s belief that they are right and so many others are wrong and the process stops there.

Therefore, however well-meant a decision may be, there is no assurance its consequences will reflect the current standard which the members of the entire system are capable of. R controls S, regardless what society wants.

Hence S must always be higher than R.

Chief Rabbi Meir Lau from Tel Aviv said that if Germany does not change the ruling, there is no reason for Jews to be there; “the Jews (in Germany) will realise this is not the place where they belong”.

He is right. If Jews identify themselves according to principles each one of which is held immutable, then a society where rational considerations apply cannot be their home. Of course, Jews are able to identify themselves without the orders from a rabbi; they could well decide to align themselves with a modern state where human rights are part of the ongoing debate.

Could they still manage to call themselves Jews?

That is not for me to decide.

Feedback in complex, dynamic systems

One essential feature of complex, dynamic systems is feedback and the mind is no exception, including the higher scale of society.

These systems contain functional elements that produce output to their environment, the environment is modified to some extent, and the resultant conditions impact on the system in turn, which then produces some output once again that feeds into the surrounds, and so on and so on.

To what extent does or can the feedback alter the system?

Since a complex system is complex no matter how intelligent its members are (even an ant hill is a complex system) the eventual result depends on the members to process the information. There may be exceptional members, but, if they are part of the feedback, the question revolves around the degree to which they are understood by the rest.

Their contribution may not be understood at all or it could be misunderstood. In either case it may not be acted upon out of fear of the unknown. Assuming a certain developmental curve towards increasing complexity, there is a time lag between what is not taken up and what is taking part in the feedback loop in any case.

If the latter is sufficient to sustain the exceptional contributors, the system will benefit from them because when the rest finally do catch up those contributors are still around. A similar effect is gained through the welfare system in those countries which can afford it. The exceptional contributors don’t survive because society values their input, they survive because they are kept alive anyway.

At the same time however the general wealth of the society making this possible needs to come from somewhere and in a competitive world a nation needs a sufficient degree of intelligence to stay ahead – which means it needs to be able to productively absorb the feedback and the more esoteric contributions (for want of a better word) may not be necessary to maintain the relative advantage.

And here is the rub: anything that gets assimilated and thus is enhancing the system’s validity has therefore a considerable impact; but likewise, a negative addition will have a destructive influence in the longer term.

Since feedback is self-defining, once a downward path has been embarked upon it becomes harder and harder to compensate for – the feedback itself will have become diminished.

A precarious phase has been entered from which it becomes impossible to recover.

Civilisations that have fallen followed that pattern. One of the most detailed descriptions of such a scenario is Edward Gibbon’s “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”.

The gradual decrease of the complexity inherent in the information that gets passed around creates constantly diminishing responses which in turn generate poorer material for the feedback loop. Not only has the overall standard deteriorated, a relatively higher contribution has a greater chance of meeting opposition and the degree of the latter’s intensity becomes a measure of the conceptual distance between the exception and the norm. The result is a accelerating deterioration of the overall mindset.

A reversal is unlikely unless the prevalent feedback mechanism is unseated through the interference by a sufficiently powerful authority. Since this type of interference requires a structural framework to perform in the first place, ordinary dynamics in terms of information flow will have been affected too – the system has changed in any case.

Examples from the intellectual realm would be inventions that were dismissed because the general ambience had no room for them. They can also be found in politics, although here the sections within a party must be considered as they could play the part of the higher authority. A similar role can be played by polls which can create an affinity with certain sections of a party who could feel empowered by them.

Examples can also be found in the biological sphere in general where the complex dynamic framework is represented by an eco-system and its members are the flora and fauna. In this case the information flow does not consist of cognitive data but of the resources such as food which must be attained and needs dispersal in order to proliferate, and which can improve or deteriorate under certain conditions. Abrupt changes can come from climate (eg, floods or drought), a sudden change in the balance of plants or animals (eg, through disease), or the availability of food in general which may support one life form over another, and that in turn influences the eco-system from then on.

Furthermore, steadily worsening conditions are harder to turn around because once the previous equilibrium has been demolished a certain re-adjustment process has set in which actually mitigates against a reversal. The system as a whole has become inherently unstable; at that point anything can happen.

The question is, can such a state be regarded as a bifurcation under the terms of chaos? After all, it is not a change from one particular pattern to another; there is no other pattern.

Is this therefore an ‘extended’ bifurcation, a dynamic space which is pattern-less, has no discernible hierarchical order of any kind, and therefore has no ‘type’?

The next question is, for how long can such a state persist?

The usual determinants of impact, scope and size of its constituent elements are no longer applicable, nor can anything be gleaned from observing the in- or output. For that kind of analysis to be useful there has to be a pattern, yet this is exactly what is missing.

Perhaps this is one situation that most closely resembles what is commonly understood by ‘chaos’, a featureless, dynamic state. Just like the brain at its inception.

This also offers an answer to the previous question. The reason the brain can change from its featureless state to a more organised system is through constantly repeated input such as parents provide for their child. Therefore the one path out of that dilemma is constancy. Constancy in terms of input, overall conditions, and the availability of resources the system needs to sustain itself. Remove any one of them and the system cannot re-form, or form altogether in the case of the infant’s brain.

In principle the nature of that constancy does not matter except in the sense of how the system is expected to perform eventually. For example, abandoned children cannot fully attain their ‘humanness’ if left outside human society for too long, where ‘too long’ refers to the time spent laying down the alien patterns. After a time the already formed internal structures cannot be undone; a phenomenon characteristic of progression lock (the constraint imposed on new developments by already established patterns).

Considerations about feedback loops, continuing to bifurcations, and then on to instability and progression locks are part of complex dynamic systems such as the mind.

The fact that they can be entertained at all demonstrates the interdependency within these systems.

Latency and memory

In the previous two posts (The secrets of latency and A new type of analysis) I discussed the issues surrounding the unrealised potential of dynamic clusters in a complex system such as the mind and what happens when the potential is being triggered by some input.

It remains tying them all together.

If the latent contents of some domain (ie, a set of clusters related through their affinities with each other) get triggered by subsequent input, it matters whether the domain was representative of some general content or of an abstraction (that is the intersection of affinitive subdomains - see previous posts).

In the latter case, if we assume a 1st level abstraction, the number of possible triggers that are able to realise the latency is higher than in the case of content-only domains, for the simple reason that an abstract possesses greater relevance to some content than a content itself since it covers more than one set of subdomains.

Since there are more possible triggers, the latency will be realised earlier; in other words, it will be shorter lived. Yet 'latency' means the capacity for storage (ie, memory), so a shorter-lived latency means less storage capacity in relation to content. Similarly, less abstract domains mean less triggering towards further abstractions, the only realisable representative type being one of content. Because abstractive representations need more neurons, without the physical structures within the brain (number of neurons, connectivity, neurotransmitters, etc) having the chance to grow, less opportunity for further abstractions and their effects exists.

In evolutionary terms the brain needed the 'right' DNA to develop further, and when that was realised (ie, the DNA's potential having been realised) abstractions could start playing their role. In some cases they did, in others less so or not at all.

At the human level the evolution of abstractive processes can be observed in societies, one manifestation being philosophy. Comparing such texts from the past to the present, the capacity to articulate an issue in an ever higher abstract form as we progress through the ages becomes obvious (see the entire Part I of the "On the origin of Mind").

In the case of DNA a comparable differentiation across latencies can be observed when we consider the development of organisms from a common base on the one hand and their various truncations over the millennia on the other (why did microbes stop evolving and not other organisms, what stopped insects, amphibians, mammals, etc etc while others were able to pass them by).

What happens when latencies become realised? Their underlying content does not disappear, rather they become modified due to their affinitive nature with some input. When they become modified they continue to possess their latent potential for triggering, but due to the modification the sets of potentially triggering input will have changed to some extent (how much depends on the degree of modification). Therefore the sets of triggers can and do change their nature in terms of the ability to act as triggers, which means that the domains in question alter what they represent in content. A representative-content drift takes place, which ensures that the resultant domain and its necessary triggers change too.

On a higher level of observation by us humans the phenomenon is articulated as 'false memory syndrome' if focused on in the context of memory recall (see chapter 15, "On the origin of Mind"). If the focus is not on memory per se any discrepancy between recall and reality may not be recognised at all. Unless specifically looked for the shift in contextual placement of some thought and/or concept is an inevitable consequence of ongoing input, especially when it comes to language.

The unceasing ambiguity surrounding our perceptions and their source within reality is the downside of a neural system that thinks. The very nature of conscious thought prevents it from being objectively processed at a distance from the 'I'. For the most part we do not know the true origins of our ideas, and yet we convince ourselves we are in control.

A new type of analysis

The familiar form of analysis relies on content. That is to say, an event and/or an object is observed, its details are noted, comparisons are employed, and a conclusion based on identified relationships is reached. That type of analysis is essentially content-based.

What if there was another form, one derived from a similar approach but now focusing on functionality, the type of behaviour and/or characteristics rather than the behaviour itself?

In the context of cognitive dynamics the use of functionality would be particularly productive since it is virtually impossible to observe every thought and idea - never mind their details. Let's examine what this means.

Complex, dynamic systems (and the mind is one example par excellence) have gained those adjectives because their sub- and sub-subsystems etc are multifaceted and in constant flux in terms of their mutual relationships and their degree of significance to the wider system. For the current purpose we label their subsystems and so on thought structures (TSs) because they represent the phenomena produced by the neuronal activities which at a higher level of interpretation we perceive as thoughts. Clusters of such activities form thought patterns, the basis for what we can label concepts, derived from a pattern of thoughts. On a lower level of the conceptual scale concepts are derived from functional domains, defined by the affinities among their processes.

Hence complexity is a summary descriptor of the extent to which the multifacetedness, its interdependencies, and its cognitive manifestations have been allowed to develop. The term can be applied to the entire system of mind or to any one of its parts, where differences in degree can and do occur. For example, the present text is the result of relatively high-complexity cognitive dynamics, but ask me about cricket and I wouldn't have a clue.

The nature of complexity is such that any one of its manifestations can grow further from the general input because the contributing TSs' variance assures that most - if not all - can process some of the input. The extent of the development depends on the quality of input, the mutual relatedness of the TSs, and their inherent latency (see previous post) - all of which are describable in terms of their specific functionality, rather than content.

Let us now concentrate on the relationship between input (in this case the communicated result of somebody else's TSs) and its effect on the side of the recipient and the TSs there.

The source of the input may well consider it to be homogenous, but to the set of TSs in the recipient with their respective domains the input represents a multitude of sub-contexts. Yet if there is intent behind the source's output (ie, its TSs form an entire pattern) then the recipient's expectations regarding its effect may well be misplaced, although any TSs on the recipient's side would not possess the wider context to recognise this.

Similarly, if there are separate articulations coming from the respective target TSs then these articulations will reflect the expectations or confirmations resulting from their individual processes. This can be scaled up: substitute the TSs with humans and the patterns with groups of people and the degree of complexity rises further.

The same principles apply, but now the probability of variance among the domains has risen. Now there are TSs within the TSs, and domains can and do overlap. Whether the overlaps are recognised as such is another question, leading to the misunderstandings referred to earlier, although once again they are not necessarily apparent to their source.

Such misunderstandings can lead to unwanted transfers, where content representative of a relatively higher abstraction level can be directed to a domain at a lower level (for abstractions see previous post). Given the propensity for affinities between abstraction levels in any case there is a considerable chance the resultant TSs will be incongruent (for example, try explaining the concepts of higher ethics to a young child when it has done something wrong). Since the context in relation to the source is now dispersed across the target domains a re-tracing of how abstraction levels formed for the purpose of clarification is made that much more difficult.

Nevertheless, it is possible to establish the relational structures of the TSs, including their respective abstraction levels and their mutual differences. While not enabling a source -> target analysis they nevertheless provide a unique snapshot of the TSs' configuration at the time. Therefore they represent a unique 'fingerprint' of a person's and/or a group's or indeed a society's conceptual organisation. Still, it is only a snapshot. Any subsequent input (either from the outside of from among the subdomains) will modify the general structure.

Given the transient nature of the resultant framework, is a comparison between two such frameworks possible?

Since the precise source -> target relationships cannot be identified, it is impossible to trace previously established relationships in order to find the newer ones. On the other hand, although we don't have recourse to a time stamp, we do have affinity relationships and their abstraction levels, and they can be identified. Because both phenomena are in a state of constant flux they are therefore subject to the constraints of time-related dispersal across their domains. That is to say, if we compare the structures of sub-domains and observe their linkages, those that are dispersed to a higher degree (ie, had more time to create the linkages) will most likely be those that had occurred before the less dispersed ones. Setting a cut-off point along those lines for both of the sets (comparing set 1 with set 2) leads us to a useful normalisation.

This approach cannot be regarded as failsafe, since in the end we do not know to what extent each TS could have been able to relate to any other structure. Still, they give us a general picture of the results of the cognitive dynamics in existence and any marginal errors can be tested for by re-setting the cut-off points (while not telling us anything more about their history it allows us to disregard the more compact structures in favour of those that did form a more comprehensive network).

The question arises: can such an analysis be done via a simulation (eg, a version of the OtoomCM), sufficiently scaled-up to permit comparable input to be processed. Part of the answer lies in the definition of 'comparable'. No doubt an exact replica of the real set is impossible for obvious reasons. Whether a pared-down model will be informative and to what degree can only be ascertained through trials, using real-world data. Yet whatever the ultimate outcome, even simpler versions of the real should reveal cognitive imprints that tell us something about their origins.

Note: the above text is rather dense. A familiarity with how the mind works would certainly aid in its understanding, but I attempted to convey - however successfully or otherwise - how the concept of functional analysis can be applied to characterise thoughts, concepts, individuals, demographics and societies.

The secrets of latency

One of the most intriguing aspects of the system of mind is the matter of latency. It can be found in the wetware, the software simulation, indeed in nature as a whole.

In what follows I shall recapitulate via a brief summary, touch upon the ramifications and present some examples to show how useful an understanding of the issue would be.

Let's use the OtoomCM (a computer program that simulates cognitive dynamics) to see what happens. An input I1 is presented to the program, processed by the system and provides some output O1. Any output is treated in a formal manner which causes coloured discs to appear on the screen which in turn get blurred to make them look like coloured patches. The same formality is applied every time so that each end result is unique and can be compared with any other (see the web page for more detail).

Next a second input I2 is presented and we get its output O2, now different from O1, that is one or several of the patches (not all) have changed shape as well as their colour.

We take a third input I3. In most cases this will merely result in a repetition of the above, but some I3s generate an output O3 such that some particular patch has regained the qualities achieved through the initial input I1. The recurrence is not an exact copy of the latter, but the chances of a coincidental similarity are minimal (the manner in which the output is drawn on the screen sees to that).

Let's do the experiment again but this time we omit I2. Without I2 the output O3 is quite different from O3 in the previous experiment. Clearly, there is something about I3 which triggers the re-emergence of a certain state in a certain cluster of the matrix nodes so that the cluster has become functionally similar to what it was before.

We can say the cluster possesses a latency (ie, the non-manifested potential for entering a previous state) regarding O1 and I2 that gets triggered by a particular further input; other inputs won't have the same effect.

(Note that some patches do not change anyway, so presenting I3 without I2 would not the clusters responsible for those stable patches exhibit the latency as well? No - because no modification is not latency under the definition)

Before we go any further I need to point out that the state of each matrix node is defined through the collection of integers it holds and those integers get modified according to an algorithm which induces chaotic behaviour, turning each node into a stable, or periodic, or strange attractor (for more detail see the IPSI-2005 Venice paper). And yet we have latency, observable on many occasions.

Since the phenomenon exists in a specific cluster (we can tell because the patch occurs in the same location on the screen) it can be interpreted as a means of packing several layers of information within a particular domain; all it needs is for the right trigger to reveal the respective layer.

Needless to say, subsequent inputs (with and/or without the I2) cause different series of outputs, depending on whether or not there was an I2. For latency to manifest the cluster needs the right trigger, which is another way of saying that every cluster possesses latency which may or may not be triggered.

This is where it gets really interesting. We can say that ordinary inputs cause the system to come up with outputs that are a function of its cumulative states as well as its environment with its own type of inputs making the system appear ordinary in its behaviour, whereas only special inputs evoke its latent states and make the system enter an event trajectory that is now out of the ordinary.

It seems memory operates on the basis of latent cluster states among the brain's neurons being triggered by the appropriate input (for a discussion of memory see "On the origin of Mind", chapter 15). In a different context, ordinary weather relies on ordinary input to go through its common variety, but extraordinary input (eg, a combination of prolonged heat, moisture, updrafts) lead to cyclones, although the necessary functional ingredients exist throughout the air mass all the time provided by previous inputs (the causes for the temperature gradients, humidity, dew points, dust particles, etc). In another context still, dinosaurs existed on earth for a very long time, having settled in their environment in combination with all the other organisms including mammals. It took an extraordinary event to trigger the latency in the DNA structure of mammals to unfold into the complexity we find today. Note that without their respective latencies none of those extraordinary trajectories could have eventuated (ie, no memory recall, no cyclones, no humans).

Back to cognitive dynamics. An abstraction is a form of interpretation in which the principle aspects of an event and/or an object (generally termed 'system') are highlighted. For example, I can describe a pump in terms of pipes, valves and cylinder and piston, but I can abstract all this to a system consisting of a space acting as a receiver under one configuration and turning that same space into a supplier by changing the configuration. Defined in this manner I can use whatever comes in handy and, provided the functionality of the abstraction is adhered to, the resultant system will be a pump.

Cognitively speaking, an abstraction is represented by the intersection of various sets of relevant neuronal clusters; its output is the abstraction.

We can go one step further and consider the intersection of several intersections, leading to the next higher abstraction level; and so on.

For example, 'art nouveau tables' are level 1 abstractions of all the particular tables made according to that style (these particular tables could be termed level 0 abstractions); 'table' is a level 2 abstraction of 'art nouveau tables'; a 'flat surface held up by some support' is a level 3 abstraction of 'table'; 'mesa' being an example derived from a level 3 abstraction applied to terrain.

A series of outputs derived from their inputs represents the results of affinity relationships between the participating clusters, modified along their time lines by the oncoming inputs (and the affinity relationships exist within the context of chaotic systems). Affinity relationships are just that - relationships based on affinity. Therefore they occur among clusters representative of level 0 abstractions, or among clusters of a higher level. Since the creation of affinity relationships as such depends on the abilities of neurons to interact with each other and nothing more, it is - technically - possible to combine different abstraction levels with each other, but the result will be found wanting (imagine applying the criterion 'art nouveau' to a mesa).

What about latency? For a latent state to be manifest it needs a trigger, but is it feasible to have a trigger coming from a level 1 abstraction applied to a cluster representative of its level 0 counterpart? Technically yes, but what are the consequences - not only in terms of the sheer system but also in terms of the meaningfulness of the subsequent outputs as interpreted by us humans.

Remember that for latency to become manifest it needs extraordinary input. However, extraordinary input is not compatible with the ordinary inputs underpinning the entire range of clusters representative of level 0 -> n abstractions. Hence it is possible that the probability of affinities between the result of an instantiated latency and the result of ordinary states is diminished; it would be further diminished still by another manifested latency and so on - in other words, the meaningfulness of cognitive output would be sharply reduced, but there would come a point beyond which the accumulation of realised latencies has reached such a degree that meaningful affinities between them are possible once again. Within that particular context a quite different way of thinking has been achieved through the availability of extraordinary inputs, which would become less extraordinary once they have had the opportunity to establish a pattern.

At the moment the OtoomCM program cannot be run on a platform that allows for a sufficiently large-scale configuration in order to test such a scenario.

Nevertheless, this kind of investigation would reveal what it takes to literally change a person's mind - or society's for that matter. Not having to rely on ad-hoc events (our fate so far) has dramatic consequences. For that matter, unforeseen events and their effects could be mitigated, even reversed.

Here is an example from biology. Until the discovery of black swans in Western Australia Europeans firmly believed swans were always white. Imagine being able to analyse the cluster of swan DNA with respect to its feathers and their pigmentation. It would become obvious whether other colours were possible, given the availability of the necessary triggers.

Despite our knowledge in chemistry we still rely on nature to show us some particularly exotic protein formations and their qualities. Knowing how to interpret the latency along the chain of biochemical protein complexity we would be able to create those substances ourselves - provided of course they are possible but if they are not we would know that too.

The phenomenon of latency in complex, chaotic systems promises insights way beyond any investigation that relies on the availability of content-related instances of reality could furnish. It only needs an appropriately scaled simulation.